
Part 1. EFFECTIVENESS OF MANAGEMENT AT REGIONAL LEVEL

necessary to continue the search for alternative sources of energy (substitutes), no matter how expensive it is, and in spite of the lack of expected results .

Hitherto, the attempts of replacing traditional products originating from crude oil by hydrogen or biofuel have failed for economic and technical reasons. Those substitutes turned out to be impractical, especially in air transport. The current research and the analysis of literature do not show the negative effects of alternative energy sources because of lack of data in this field.

To prevent the undesirable results of possible crises, airlines all over the world combine with each other in alliances (fusions), which help survive the time of crisis. The effects of such behaviour can be, and often is, the decrease of fuel costs and other payments (airport charge, using air space), which lowers the costs of their performance.

The conclusion of the above investigation is that the negative effects connected with the exhaustion of crude oil resources can be mitigated to some extent by: the modernization of aviation equipment (buying planes which consume less oil) and the elimination of some unnecessary costs – e.g. setting up cheap airlines, or creating marketing activities aimed at maximizing the rate of occupying seats in passengers planes.

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7. The Crossroads of Praxeology in the Second Half of the 20th Century T. Kotarbiński – P. Bourdieu*

It is intended by the author to analyze the praxeology of Tadeusz Kotarbiński, a prominent Polish reist, awarded the French Legion of Honour, as well as to present the famous French sociologist P. Bourdieu. The contributions by Kotarbiński were inhibited by Real Socialism whereas Bourdieu wrote during the disintegration of the French colonial empire and the anti-leftist backlash in the French intellectual elites – the processes of the last quarter of the 20th century. The common denominator for Kotarbiński's normative praxeology and the *dominium potestas* of the socio-praxeological concepts by Bourdieu include the recognition of the pressure of time and openness to various aspects of the social context. Indeed, Bourdieu posits

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praxeology in the outskirts of philosophy and surrounds it with a number of dimensions of elementally rendered social contexts.

The comparison of Kotarbiński and Bourdieu could reveal a vast number of societal perils and the helplessness of humanistic reflection that attempts, to at least, diagnose these perils.

7.1. Tadeusz Kotarbiński – Promoter of Normative Praxeology

Kotarbiński was 49 in 1945 when WWII ended. The body of his work included tens of studies on the history of philosophy, interpreted as a purely intellectual programme. He was a clear materialist, espousing concrete²¹² and atheistic marxism. Kotarbiński's prewar work on Aristotle, Bacon, Marx and Brentano led him to a peculiar type of epistemology – to reism. In most general terms, reism is an ontological theory that opposes the existence of any general objects – only things exist. Kotarbiński's intellectual tenets provided for freeing philosophy from terminological debates associated with abstract objects' names, which he called non-genuine names or onomatoids.

In his philosophical path, T. Kotarbiński intended to resolve two planes of problems – issues of gnosiology and the classification of sciences. As part of the classification of sciences, praxeology, submitted by the positivist A. Comte's disciple Alfred Espinas (1844-1922) as a postulate of a self-standing science, means the end to scientific methodology taxonomy disputes. Also, being a highly reductionist science, it was compatible with marxism, to which Kotarbiński was quite well predisposed. So was the great logician S. Leśniewski and part of the Lvov-Warsaw school of thought. In the intellectual milieu of prewar Poland, it was commonly believed that civilizational and scientific progress was indispensable and so was social modernization. Marxism was not seen as inextricably Bolshevik because in the early years of the Soviet experiment (the 1920s) it was ideologically ambiguous²¹³.

In Kotarbiński's reism each thing is at the same time a body (pansomatism) and the object of research. His scientific programme was close to physicalism.

²¹² Concrete marxism here means such a reception of marxism where the last instance of appeal in case of any doubt is each time praxis, both scholarly as well as everyday.

²¹³ Statist economy was also promoted by the early 20th century Germans whereas in the the 1920s USSR more synagogues were established than in the whole preceding period in the Russian polity. Some Bolsheviks, such as Gen. Sverdlovsk had burials in the Jewish rite. The Soviet Russia of the 1920s saw marxism, anarchism (Savinkov) and nationalism fight for supremacy. Cf. A. Solzhenitsyn, *Dwieście lat razem, t. II W porewolucyjnej Rosji*. (2014), trans. A. Mayer, N. Krzyżanowska-Barwińska, Wrocław: WERS [only incomplete English translations available online; note by L.K.] and W. Zubow, *Lata przez mękę Rosja 1917-1925*. trans. D. Ulicka, (2015), Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Sedno & Centrum Polsko-Rosyjskiego Dialogi i Porozumienia.

Physicalistic materialism could both oppose psychologism – a scholarly manner plaguing the humanities of the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries – and something very attractive in its distinctness as phenomenology. Both in Nature and in society all bodies are in motion and in a mutual relation. In order to explain the pursuits and relations between people, Kotarbiński proposed praxeology – a self-standing science on human actions and ways to make them perfect.

Regarding praxeology, its main job is to create recommendations and caveats concerning skillful, that is rational, action in general, and thus valid in all domains of human activity, on a farm, in the military defense, in healthcare, judiciary, education, etc²¹⁴.

Praxeology is thus an area of philosophical deliberations that occurs in various systems – particularly the rationalistic ones, beginning with Aristotle – and means both a description and an evaluation of human actions.

[...] is present in all action, which tends to be important when describing it: we always act in a context, made upon of the environment, that is, all that surrounds us, and the situation – all the states of these things or their change over the time the action takes place. The time the action takes place is here understood to be the period from the beginning of any impulse until the end of the change resulting from it.²¹⁵

Actions can be productive, unproductive or counter-productive. In reducing some problems to the description and evaluation of actions, one obtains an omission of the deliberations on consciousness, will, intention or emotions at each stage of human activity. Praxeology can thus be said to be a philosophical superstructure over ergonomics, a science of the physical movement of the human body, at the expense of considerable reductions related to neurons and psyche, whose activity it did not reckon with, thus going over a number of issues. A polemic with reism, thus conceived, and its consequences, arose among logicians with a positivist orientation.

K. Ajdukiewicz criticized Kotarbiński saying that materialistic reism is a logical tautology. If only things exist, every object is a thing and things do not differ from one another [$a = r$; $b = r$; $a = b$]. Praxeology could thus speak of states and characteristics of human and only human actions, (not the forces of Nature, animals or any other 'Cosmic Causer'). A foundation of such a system was consistent atheism²¹⁶, with its supplementation in ethics.

For T. Kotarbiński, praxeology had some more advantages. It not only

²¹⁴ T. Kotarbiński, "Prakseologia a ekonomia" [in] *Drogi dociekań własnych. Fragmenty filozoficzne. W setną rocznicę urodzin.*, (1986), Warsaw: PWN, p. 259.

²¹⁵ T. Kotarbiński, *Abecadło praktyczności*, (1974/2) Warsaw: WP, p. 33. trans. L.K.

²¹⁶ J. Kolarzowski, "Supremacja prawdy: filozofia Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego w poszukiwaniu wspólnego fundamentu dla reizmu i etyki niezależnej", [in:] *Myśl Tadeusza Kotarbińskiego i jej współczesna recepcja* (2006), Warsaw: Polska Akademia Nauk, Towarzystwo Naukowe Prakseologii, pp. 27-34.

described the states and features of human actions but welcomed the marxist practicalism (K. Marx's XI thesis on Feuerbach) and foreshadowed the ultimate abolition of philosophy as a science. Praxeology thus conceived could be separated from both the theories of organization, pursued in the West, and from ethics. The secondary quality of ethics in relation to praxeology resulted from the tenets of physicalist materialism, adopted earlier, and the ambiguity of the term 'tool.' The author of the *Praxeology. An introduction to the science of efficient action* wrote:

[...] the knowledge of efficient, productive and economical actions is purely instrumental. Like a knife, it can be used for various purposes, good or bad. Does this imply that we need to abandon the production of knives and using them?²¹⁷

T. Kotarbiński's praxeology proved to be a normative field of science. It is intentional normativity and it encompasses intentions as impulses of human activity. The step from intentional normativity is indeed minimal. Human activity ought to be subjected to all kinds of laws, instructions, regulations. A human individual was supposed to be reduced to the role of a self-perfecting machine so much endowed with agency as they could perfect their own industrial, exploratory and scholarly productivity. The issues of causality thus came to lose all that can be termed *conditio humana*, and which used to be part of the Hellenistic worldview and the view of man.

What is characteristic and worthy of further research is the belief in the law and its power, understood in positivist terms, on the part of a great many marxists and marxist apparatchiks. Juridicizing tendencies are typical of weak states with an unsustainable multi-generational identity, such as the German society.

Not so in praxeology, which abhors the excesses of law in any conditions and systemic realities. No dimensionality on its part ever proved sustainable, not even the US production-to-consumption single-dimensionality, described by the neo-marxist Herbert Marcuse in his famous *One Dimensional Man*²¹⁸.

At the end of the Second World War (1945) T. Kotarbiński was 49 years old. He did not include in his whole output, issues of diversity of work (different value of manual and intellectual labour)²¹⁹. This became a problem which has become a nightmare and to great extent the cause of the disaster of the formation of real socialism. As the service cannot provide the wealth of the middle class in contemporary capitalism, the physical work, which in the

²¹⁷ T. Kotarbiński, *Abecadło praktyczności*, op. cit., p. 67.

²¹⁸ H. Marcuse, *One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society* (1991), 2nd ed., Boston: Beacon Press.

²¹⁹ F. Znaniecki, *Upadek cywilizacji zachodu*, wyd. UW, Warszawa 2013.

countries of the Eastern block was equal to the intellectual work could not create a basis for winning the competition with the West. Science and technology in favourable conditions can be a source of significant income and serve to multiply capital accumulation. Effective management on a global scale should therefore take into account the multiplicity of activities and the diversity of ways of acquiring income. Sometimes in the passing of an era it is difficult to see diversity, when this is blocked by doctrinal assumptions.

7.2. Pierre Bourdieu's Praxeology within Sociology – the Axiology of Possession

Through his consistent inclusion of praxeology in social sciences, the French sociologist P. Bourdieu avoided being consumed by the 'demon of theory' and pushed social sciences towards the theory of action. Investigating individual activities and group practice was reflected in the titles of his work, such as *Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action* or *Practical Sense*. It was also noticeable in the way he used notions that focused societal reflection on acts by individual people. He created a concept of a universal individual pursuing various significance in society. The significance can be achieved by the sense of possession, the socio-professional role, the honours received and the influence on society. One need not only be but also have, e.g. opportunities and create a socio-economic reality around one.

Bourdieu thought that while living in a capitalist society one cannot really free oneself from various forms of admiration for capital²²⁰. He explained in this way the paramount influence and appeal of the economy, contributing to the not-so-obvious development of the concept of *capital*, which sharing some elements, easily transcends the boundaries of some domains of knowledge, determining and delineating their research areas (such as mathematics and history). Along with relative clauses, the term set out on a pan-humanistic career. Beside capital, we encounter the term political capital (translated into votes), social capital, cultural capital, or, descending onto the micro-relations that shape the ethos of employees – the capital of confidence. The relevant notions that take away the weight from capital proved to include symbolic capital and symbolic violence. In his opinion, different kinds of capital can go from one form to another²²¹.

²²⁰ One can just hide the feeling, control it by way of free will and, by means of intellect, dialectically reverse the emotional tendency while remaining in inner perplexity, such as when doing everyday activities: shopping, drafting domestic budgets, and watching TV in particular. The latter was attributed a particularly negative role by Bourdieu. He indicated that it deprives viewers of social self-actualization.

²²¹ P. Bourdieu, *Ce que parler veut dire : L'économie des échanges linguistiques*, (1982) Paris: Fayard.

Bourdieu believed that every social scientist ought to set before themselves a task and an area of its analysis. This is an a-priori activity and one fraught with risk. The research area will be described properly as long as one reveals the hidden, that which is not obvious, something that does not yield to one-factor explanation. Therefore the French scholar described his writing as socio-analysis, making a reference to psychoanalysis of S. Freud, who was supposed to amend this process by making aware and speaking out about that which is buried in the deposits of memory, consciousness or subconsciousness. This is a vital difference because by using this one lexical passkey – socio-analysis – the post-marxist Bourdieu was tapping into the mainstream of European philosophy, which keeps elaborating on the world of humans, beginning from the Platonic cave (and along with Plato's *anamnesis*, ie. remembering the knowledge that is hidden from the beginning of the world). Socioanalysis is then – as is psychoanalysis – 20th century modern forms of the Platonic epistemology.

P. Bourdieu did not write a book that demonstrated a general theory of the field in social sciences²²². However, the very metaphorical term²²³ (Fr. *le champ*) can be explained on the basis of the writer's works. This means a fragment of the social structure characterized by its bringing together individuals and groups concentrated on similar pursuits and rivalling for position within them. The field of social activity pivots around the binding objectives, principles and criteria thought to be particularly important. These Bourdieu would call the stakes in a game that is played in society. The societal field is permeated by a number of processes, but for a sociologist, the most recognizable are those that occur consciously and where the potential of individuals is launched with a big dose of individual initiative. For those that take up this game, the paramount principle that holds in a given field is the way one imagines the prizes, benefits, recognition, any satisfaction, which we shape, above all, in our imagination.

What becomes manifest here is practical antinomy, which science has to overcome when, at the expense of breaking with all forms of operationalism, which silently accepts the basic tenets of practical logic while being unable to objectify them, and which wants to understand for itself, and in itself, the logic of praxis that understands in order to act, but not in order to change or reform it²²⁴.

²²² More on the author's terminological grid see J. Kolarzowski, „Wprowadzenie do teorii socjologiczno-prakseologicznej Pierre'a Bourdieu”, [in] *Prawo – Samorząd – Administracja* (2014), D. Strus, A. Duk-Majewska eds. Warsaw: Aspra.

²²³ Multiple spatial metaphor use in social sciences was remarked on by S. Ossowski *O osobliwościach nauk społecznych*. (1962), Warsaw: PWN. This phenomenon in linguistic and statistical terms was subjected to investigation in various world's languages by cognitive linguists: G. Lakoff & M. Johnson in *Metaphors We Live by* (2003), Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

²²⁴ P. Bourdieu, *Zmysł praktyczny*, trans. M. Falski (2008,) Kraków: wyd. WUJ, p.123. Trans. Into English by L.K.

Working mostly by way of mind and imagination, in social life, scientists often lapse into a special kind of antinomy, with the rest of the general public pursuing the practical, guided by profit and trying to minimize effort.

The imaginational apriority in sociology and praxeology is not new, but Bourdieu took it to the remotest extreme of all scholars. Like money was to the father of sociology, G. Simmel, a symbolic form to do with human history, for P. Bourdieu almost all human activity, particularly directed at others, has a symbolic meaning, prevenient of complementary to that which is concrete. For a judge who is handing out the verdict, what matters is the place where it occurs, the tone of voice, the attitude taken, just like for an academic, the site, the audience, and their attention ought to be just as important as the structure of the speech that has been prepared. The acting individual – *homo agens* – is a better or worse social actor, and life forces on us this peculiarity to do, above all, the duties we are to fulfill, in the context and towards others or ourselves, but it is often done in connection with the everyday activities (such as putting on different clothes on different occasions)²²⁵.

Symbolic violence is the most famous term and the heart of Bourdieu's theory, which gave an impetus to anthropology and cultural ethnology. In the simplest terms, it concerns the private and the public. *Symbolic violence* comes to be felt when we come to be brought up and educated. We need to accept it without disputing in order to remain in the existing system, avoid punishment or exclusion. The most significant dimension for *symbolic violence* is 'silent consent' of all concerned. Symbolic violence is just an introduction to symbolic struggle, where all Bourdieu's praxeology potential is exposed as his praxeology is, above all, the praxeology of struggle²²⁶.

The subject matter of social sciences is the reality that encompasses all struggle, individual and collective, striving to preserve or transform the reality; in the focus of attention are those forms of struggle where the stake is the imposition of a legitimate definition of reality and whose often purely symbolic efficacy may contribute to the preservation or abolition of the established order, that is reality²²⁷.

Human morality and the status of the fields is subordinated to struggle occurring in various areas where we are to act. The symbolic quality of these

²²⁵ In several of his works, Bourdieu cites research done on France's workers. Those that paid particular attention to appearance did not always care much about personal hygiene. This forced food producers to use open dressing rooms.

²²⁶ Polish praxeology attained this level upon the death of T. Kotarbiński in 1981, only after J. Rudniański published his *Elementy prakseologicznej teorii walk: z zagadnień kooperacji negatywnej*, Warsaw: PWN, 1983; *Kompromis i walka: sprawność i etyka kooperacji pozytywnej i negatywnej w gęstym otoczeniu społecznym* (1989), Warsaw: IW Pax.

²²⁷ P. Bourdieu, *Zmysł praktyczny*, op.cit., pp. 193-194. retrans L.K.

games, strategies or struggle is obvious for him. In most social situations, morality does occupy a privileged place, but only second to guaranteeing oneself the priority of one's own interests.

As a sociologist I know that morality only works when it is based on structures, mechanisms making people stand to gain from their being moral. So, in order for the appearing something like moral anxiety, it must find support and reinforcement (rewards) in structure. The source of these rewards could be the public (were it to be more enlightened and aware of the manipulations it is subjected to)²²⁸.

The boundaries of the fields are subject to constant struggle. The history of the shaping of activity fields has been about the attainment of an increasing autonomy, being liberated from the influence of people, institutions, external forces. The essential thing here is the imaginary perception of the borderline carried by each participant in the field. The meaning of the borders is materialized externally – as opposed to the peculiarity of the other fields – and internally, that is, towards the participants in the field. Opening up to external influence is tantamount to accepting foreign logic, the legitimacy of another field. For a number of centuries, since the tribal era and as far as recent class economy homogeneity of fields and their separation – distinctions – were striven for. This was served by rituals and the law, declared by those in power.

Since symbolic struggle tends to come short of transgressing the framework defined by the immediate proximity and may only perform partial revolutions, it means that, as we said, its borders are institutionalized tokens of consecration and the testimonies of charisma, such as nobility or school ties, objectivized tokens of respect, apparatus or ceremoniality that result in not only manifesting the social position, but also collective recognition, attributed to it by the mere fact of granting it rights to making such a show of its own significance. [...] 'Status groups' by means of an institutionalized strategy of distinction strive for the recognition of actual differences as permanent and almost natural, and thus legitimate, thus symbolically doubling the distinction effect connected to occupying rare positions in social structure; institutionalized strategies of distinction are the self-knowledge of the dominant class²²⁹.

Contemporarily we are dealing with the homogenization of the fields of human activity and strife between the influences of one area upon others, which in extreme or unfossilized situations (young democracies) may take the

²²⁸ P. Bourdieu, *O telewizji. Panowanie dziennikarstwa*, trans. K. Sztandar-Sztanderska and M. Ziółkowska, ed. M. Jacyno [scholarly redaction and a preface to the Polish edition] (2009), Warsaw: PWN, SW series, p. 88. retrans. L.K.

²²⁹ P. Bourdieu, *Zmysł praktyczny*, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

forms of some of them pushing against the others, like tectonic plates of the earth's crust, which has and may yet cause, deplorable earthquakes.

Bourdieu's concept, developed over the years of investigating the schooling system in France, corroborated on the communities of settlers in North Africa, as applied by him for the description of the world of the media. This opponent of liberal newspeak considered media, ad TV in particular, as the source of a particularly dangerous and immoral social oppression, posing a threat to relatively new democratic institutions, such as the independent judiciary, governments created in the aftermath of free elections, or any other institutions legitimized by collective consciousness.

I would like to demonstrate the existence of a sequence of mechanisms making TV a tool of a particularly harmful form of symbolic violence. Symbolic violence is what often happens with silent complicity of both those subjected to it and the perpetrators. This is happening also because neither are conscious of the fact of its exertion and experiencing. The job of sociology, like any other science, is to reveal what is hidden²³⁰.

The danger from the media is two-fold: external and internal. Like all humanities, sociology in particular too, can be used to reveal and expose to light that which is hidden, mean or manipulated, but it can also serve the purpose of concealing and gratifying all that should be opposed by society. Since I. Kant, who thought that a well-organized society is one where even a bad person will act morally, as much time has passed as since the French revolution, and a number of mechanisms simply do not work. Just as much as the Communist experiment did not prove to be a path that accelerates social or economic development on the expected scale, neither did its demise in the last decade of the 20th century prevent serious dangers: the corporatism of global giants use media to influence societies and their governments.

Despite very strong competition between the journalistic and the political fields, and with the actors from these being engaged in continuous struggle (the journalistic field somehow being part of the political field and having significant influence within it), the fields are brought together by the fact of both being subjected to immediate and very constraining rule of the market and plebiscite. As a consequence, the dominance of the journalistic field boosts the inclination of those actors who perform in the political field to be often subjected to violent and misguided pressure, expectations and demands of the majority, which as a result of the form imposed by the press, take the form of demands having a mobilizing potential²³¹.

At the same time, on the part of television, which in his view should

²³⁰ P. Bourdieu, *O telewizji*. *Panowanie dziennikarstwa*, op. cit., p. 42.

²³¹ P. Bourdieu, *O telewizji*. *Panowanie dziennikarstwa*, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

have a role similar to the Socratic maieutic method²³², we are dealing with a number of forms of dishonesty: bad treatment of those having smaller expertise, asking celebrities to talk about things rather foreign to them, placing people alongside one another in panels that would otherwise never met (sociologist of religion and a leader of a cult) so as to build upon thus created cacophony a false image of today and contemporary history. History, built from various unrelated vantage points, is like an unexpected blow, like a blow that is supposed to make the listener or viewer a brainwashed individual, torn away from their identity.

Anything to do with the media, particularly television, is subjected to ranking vote, distorting and degrading all standards:

The effect of all that is that the ever increasing primacy of the journalistic field (which is itself subjected to a growing domination of commercial logic) over the political field – forever tormented by the temptation of demagoguery (particularly when the polls provide it with a tool of doing it in an rationalized fashion) – contributes to the weakening of the autonomy of the political field and at the same time the weakening of the right granted to representatives to refer to their expertise and their authority of being the custodians of collective values²³³.

The destruction of trust in a specialist from the 'box' is, in Bourdieu's opinion, the first step to breaking any injunctions and to using criminal methods so long as this goes undetected. Thence the assault of the respectable sociologist against the media of the 1990s, which he would compare to sports people using doping:

Thus, the increased power of the journalistic field itself increasingly subject to direct or indirect domination by the market model threatens the autonomy of other fields of cultural production. It does so by supporting those actors or enterprises at the very core of these fields that are most inclined to yield to the seduction of "external" profits precisely because they are less rich in capital specific to the field (scientific, literary, or other) and therefore less assured of the specific rewards the field is in a position to guarantee in the short or longer term²³⁴.

The mechanism of creating social roles had become an important problem for Bourdieu: the roles that individual *homo agens* will be using every day in family and society²³⁵. The first criterion of the suitable description of roles is logic. But even pragmatic logic cannot be the sole criterion of the

²³² Trying to reach the truth by asking more and more questions that break language clichés.

²³³ P. Bourdieu, *O telewizji. Panowanie dziennikarstwa*, op. cit., p. 116.

²³⁴ P. Bourdieu, *On Television*, trans. P. Parkhurst Ferguson (1998), NY: The New Press, p. 74.

²³⁵ P. Bourdieu, *Męska dominacja*, trans. L. Kopciewicz, (2004), Warsaw: Oficyna Naukowa.

verification for the complex aspect of human behaviour. Individual behaviour is subjected to group pressure. Behaviour is dictated by a group that often adopts a sinusoidal form. Their logicity depends on the determining by way of an ordering quantifier – time, ways these are felt or perceived.

Unlike logic – the work of thought that is about thinking about the work of thought – praxis precludes any interest in the formal side. Even if there happens to be a return to action itself (whenever automations fail), it will be subordinated to a pursuit of a goal and a pursuit (not necessarily perceived) of maximizing profit from the effort invested. Nor does it have anything in common with a desire for explaining how the result was achieved, or even less with an attempt to understand [...]²³⁶.

The primacy of interest is for Bourdieu beyond doubt. The boundary for the drive for possession is another human being, and it was only towards the end of the 20th century when it turned out that environmental issues entered a number of fields, taking over relationships between sciences by way of demonstrating the dangers for the existence of mankind on Earth. We learn for our whole lives from cause-and-effect relationships to love relationships and leadership conditions, allowing for vast possibilities of anticipating others' behaviour. *Homo agens*' wishful thinking goes towards the reconciliation of possession with ethics. However, such a situation may occur given some competition, clear rules of conduct and situations that are predictable. The intensive dynamic of changes makes socio-analysis an indispensable science. Before we recognize the dangers that destroy our identities, our interests and political or social structures, we must know enough about them and about us in relation to them. Alas, according to Bourdieu, an era of universal unawareness²³⁷ is coming in the excess of the tools possessed and information gathered.

Crossroads of praxeology's in the Second Half of the 20th century. We can show methodological dilemmas of praxeology comparing concepts of T. Kotarbiński and P. Bourdieu. For Kotarbiński praxeology is an autonomous branch and *in fine* normative concept of science. For Bourdieu, praxeology emerges from under the pressure of axiology - of the possessive instinct.

²³⁶ P. Bourdieu, *Zmysł praktyczny*, op. cit., p. 123.

²³⁷ Unawareness/unthinking, in Bourdieu's understanding has an array of meanings, which Aristotle gave to the term – a plight that in itself determines guilt because the effort put into gaining knowledge and skills of anticipation were highly insufficient. At the same time the state of unawareness can account for incorrect human activity – unconditionality, passivity, instinctiveness, unintentionality, unconsciousness, automated response.